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Essay
The Tulsa Race Massacre of 1921:
A Lesson in the Law of Trespass
KARA W. SWANSON
The Connecticut Law Review Symposium poses the question: “History and the
Tulsa Race Massacre: What’s the Law Got to Do With It?” In one sense, the answer
to the question is easy. Since 1921, Black Tulsans have been looking to law and
lawyers to address the harms inflicted during the Tulsa Race Massacre, albeit with
little success. I was asked to consider, however, the startling lack of recognition of the
Massacre—that is, the seemingly impossible feat of forgetting the racially motivated
wholesale destruction of a community. In this Essay, I focus on one space of nonrecognition, law schools, and on property law classrooms in particular. U.S. lawyers
learn what property is and how the law defines, shapes, and protects it without any
knowledge of the Tulsa Race Massacre.
To explore the costs of such ignorance, I have rewritten the Symposium’s starting
question to ask: what might we learn if property law was taught with knowledge of the
Massacre? My short answer is that we all, as lawyers, would learn about race and
property in ways that would not only better equip us to engage in the crucial ongoing
tasks of reevaluation, reparations, and redress with respect to Tulsa, but also to
understand how property works in each community in the United States.
As my long answer, I offer a property law lesson on the law of trespass. By
incorporating the Tulsa Race Massacre in this lesson, we consider Black Americans
as property owners, a role in which they seldom appear in a property course. I
consider how, once students have learned the definition and purpose of the trespass
doctrine, we could then review the doctrine with attention to the events of the
Massacre, asking who committed trespass against whose property and assessing the
legal consequences or lack thereof. The revised lesson would encourage us as lawyers
to be attentive to our roles in defining and enforcing property rights in racialized
ways. By recognizing the conflation of property rights and race in U.S. law, a truth
grounded in history, we gain the power to stop repeating history and, instead, to make
a different future by disrupting historic relationships that have tied property and
power to racial identity.
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The Tulsa Race Massacre of 1921:
A Lesson in the Law of Trespass
KARA W. SWANSON *
Thank you to the organizers for convening the Connecticut Law Review
Symposium on October 22, 2021 for a discussion of the Tulsa Race
Massacre and for inviting me to participate. I join the discussion as a learner,
along my ongoing journey as a lawyer, historian, and law professor.
INTRODUCTION
In this Essay, I focus on the Symposium’s subtitle: “What’s the Law Got
to Do With It?” In one sense, the answer to that question is easy. Since 1921,
Black Tulsans have been looking to law and lawyers to address the harms
inflicted during the Tulsa Race Massacre, with little success.1 Lawyers can
translate experiences into the language of law to seek remedies in court. I
was asked, however, to address the startling lack of recognition of the
Massacre—that is, the seemingly impossible feat of forgetting the racially
motivated wholesale destruction of a community. Scott Ellsworth, my fellow
*
Professor of Law and Affiliate Professor of History, Northeastern University. B.S., Yale
University; M.A./J.D., University of California-Berkeley; Ph.D., Harvard University. I thank
Connecticut Law Review’s Symposium Editors and my fellow panelists, Scott Ellsworth and Sara Bronin,
for a stimulating Symposium, “History and the Tulsa Race Massacre: What’s the Law Got to Do With
It?” and the chance to present an earlier version of these remarks on the “Lack of Recognition” panel. I
thank law librarian Scott Akehurst-Moore for research assistance.
1
See Larry O’Dell, Riot Property Loss, in TULSA RACE RIOT: A REPORT BY THE OKLAHOMA
COMMISSION TO STUDY THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 143, 144–45 (2001) (reviewing $1.8 million in
damage claims filed against the city in the 1920s, all of which were dismissed except for one by a white
resident for guns taken from his shop by white rioters); A LFRED L. BROPHY, RECONSTRUCTING THE
DREAMLAND: THE TULSA RIOT OF 1921, RACE, REPARATIONS, AND RECONCILIATION 96–101 (2002)
(citing evidence that claims totaling $5 million were filed with the City and denied, followed by
unsuccessful state and federal lawsuits); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr., When Law Fails: History, Genius, and
Unhealed Wounds after Tulsa’s Race Riot, in WHEN LAW FAILS: MAKING SENSE OF MISCARRIAGES OF
JUSTICE 50, 55–60 (Charles J. Ogletree, Jr. & Austin Sarat eds., 2009) (detailing early unmet claims for
restitution and an unsuccessful restitution lawsuit filed in 2003, Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206
(10th Cir. 2004)); see also Redfearn v. Am. Cent. Ins. Co., 243 P. 929 (Okla. 1926) (denying insurance
coverage to a white landowner seeking restitution for two buildings destroyed in Massacre under a riot
exclusion clause). In September 2020, a new lawsuit was filed on behalf of survivors and descendants of
victims based on a state law prohibiting public nuisances. SCOTT ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING:
AN AMERICAN CITY AND ITS SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 251–53 (2021) [hereinafter ELLSWORTH, THE
GROUND BREAKING]; Maria Cramer, Tulsa Massacre Survivors Sue City Nearly 100 Years After Attack,
N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/01/us/tulsa-race-massacre-lawsuit.html (May 20, 2021);
DeNeen L. Brown, Judge Allows Lawsuit by Tulsa Race Massacre Survivors to Proceed, WASH. POST
(May 3, 2022) (reporting on partial denial of motion to dismiss plaintiffs’ claims).
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panelist and author of the first scholarly history of the Massacre, has described
the ways in which that forgetting was encouraged and perpetuated.2
There have been many layers to this forgetting over the last 100 years.
As a historian, I am particularly struck by the deliberate efforts of white
Tulsa to destroy and lose the documentary evidence of the event—efforts
that Ellsworth encountered in his research. He found pages sliced out of
surviving copies of a local white-owned newspaper to hide its editorial
incitement of anti-Black violence, missing files, and rumors of disappearing
boxes of photographs.3 The silence may have begun in Tulsa, but it has
spread throughout Oklahoma and other states. In social studies classes, in
history textbooks, and in popular books, the Tulsa Race Massacre—perhaps
the most extensive racially motivated destruction of a community in the
twentieth-century United States—has been simply absent, even as the
survivors and their descendants remembered.4
2
SCOTT ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND: THE TULSA RACE RIOT OF 1921 104–07 (1982)
[hereinafter ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND] (describing a “segregation of memory” in which
white Tulsans were much more reluctant to discuss the Massacre than Black Tulsans); ELLSWORTH, THE
GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, 42–47; see also Sara Bronin, Remarks at the University of
Connecticut Law Review Symposium: “The Tulsa Race Massacre: What’s the Law Got to Do With It?”
(Oct. 22, 2021) (explaining the role of historic preservation law in our collective remembering and
suggesting how it might be shifted to reclaim spaces that give meaning and materiality to memories of
the Massacre and what was destroyed); Jamila Jefferson-Jones, Using Historic Preservation Law to Halt
the Destruction of “Porch Culture” in the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV.
211, 212 (2015) (arguing for the role of historic preservation law in preserving “the history of a
community” in the context of a Black neighborhood in post-Katrina New Orleans).
3
ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 5–9, 70–72, 84–88 (detailing missing
materials).
4
See, e.g., Final Report of the Oklahoma Commission to Study the Tulsa Race Riot of 1921, in
TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 1, at 6 (describing the Massacre as the “most important least known event
in the state’s entire history”); John Hope Franklin, Foreword to ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED
LAND, supra note 2, at xv–xvii (recounting his memories of the event as a six-year-old boy living in
Oklahoma and how it was discussed afterwards in Tulsa); Don Ross, Prologue to TULSA RACE RIOT,
supra note 1, at iv–vii (remembering when he first learned about the Massacre and how the silence had
been perpetuated). Note that Black and white Tulsans have not only different oral histories of the
Massacre, but different reasons for being reticent to speak. ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND,
supra note 2, at 104–07. Fortunately, since the Commission report, information about the Massacre is
being distributed to many audiences, from children to adults, including in graphic and video forms. In
addition to other books cited in this Essay, see, e.g., MARY E. JONES PARRISH, THE NATION MUST
AWAKE: MY WITNESS TO THE TULSA RACE MASSACRE OF 1921 (Trinity Univ. Press 2021) (1923);
CAROLE BOSTON WEATHERFORD, UNSPEAKABLE: THE TULSA RACE MASSACRE (2021); BRANDY
COLBERT, BLACK BIRDS IN THE SKY: THE STORY AND LEGACY OF THE 1921 TULSA RACE MASSACRE
(2021); ALVERNE BALL & STACEY ROBINSON, ACROSS THE TRACKS: REMEMBERING GREENWOOD,
BLACK WALL STREET, AND THE TULSA RACE MASSACRE (2021); TULSA: THE FIRE AND THE
FORGOTTEN (PBS 2021); KARA L. LAUGHLIN, THE TULSA RACE MASSACRE (2021); TIM MADIGAN,
THE BURNING: BLACK WALL STREET AND THE TULSA RACE MASSACRE OF 1921 (2001); TIM MADIGAN,
THE BURNING: BLACK WALL STREET AND THE TULSA RACE MASSACRE OF 1921 (Hilary Beard ed.,
Young Readers ed. 2021) (adapting Madigan’s work for a younger audience); JERROLYN S. EULINBERG,
A LYNCHED BLACK WALL STREET: A WOMANIST PERSPECTIVE ON TERRORISM, RELIGION, AND BLACK
RESILIENCE IN THE 1921 TULSA RACE MASSACRE (2021); KRIS ROSE, WHITE RIOT/BLACK MASSACRE:
A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE 1921 TULSA RACE MASSACRE (2021); RANDY KREHBIEL, TULSA, 1921:
REPORTING A MASSACRE (2019); JAMES S. HIRSCH, RIOT AND REMEMBRANCE: THE TULSA RACE WAR
AND ITS LEGACY (2002).
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In this Essay, I focus on one space of non-recognition of the Massacre,
law schools, and on property law classrooms in particular, as they are a
near-universal aspect of U.S. legal education. Due to this general forgetting,
U.S. lawyers learn what property is and how the law defines, shapes, and
protects it without any knowledge of the Massacre. As the Symposium’s
organizers have acknowledged, this ignorance has costs. Without knowledge
of the Massacre, lawyers are ill-equipped to answer the question, “What’s
the law got to do with it?” We cannot use law to change injustices that we
cannot see.
The costs of such ignorance on the part of lawyers reach beyond the
bounds of Tulsa, as important as localized discussions of the Massacre are. To
explore these deeper costs, I have rewritten the Symposium’s starting question
to ask: what might we learn if property law was taught with knowledge of the
Tulsa Race Massacre? My short answer is that we all, as lawyers, would learn
about race and property in ways that would not only better equip us to engage
in the crucial ongoing tasks of reevaluation, reparations, and redress with
respect to Tulsa, but also to understand how property works in each
community in the United States. The events in Tulsa from May 31, 1921 to
June 1, 1921 offer new insights into what Professor Cheryl I. Harris, another
Symposium participant, demonstrated decades ago: “rights in property are
contingent on, intertwined with, and conflated with race.”5
For my long answer to the Symposium’s question, I invite you to join
me in reconsidering a lesson that is included early in most property courses:
a lesson in the law of trespass. By incorporating the Tulsa Race Massacre in
this lesson, we consider Black Americans as successful property owners, a
role in which they seldom appear in a property course. I consider how, once
students have learned the definition and purpose of the trespass doctrine,
often considered foundational to the very meaning of property, we could
then review the doctrine with attention to the events of the Massacre, asking
who committed trespass against whose property and assessing the legal
consequences or lack thereof. The revised lesson would encourage lawyers
to be attentive to their roles in defining and enforcing property rights in
racialized ways. By recognizing the conflation of property rights and race in
U.S. law, a truth grounded in history, we gain the power not just to address
history, as important as that task is, but also to avoid repeating it. With that
power comes the ability to make a different future by disrupting historic
relationships that have tied property and power to racial identity.6
Before getting to the lesson itself, I offer a précis of the Massacre that
could serve to introduce it to students. Like many teachers, I rely heavily on
resources prepared by others. The précis is prepared from my reading of the
5

Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1714 (1993).
This brief Essay, like this Symposium, is a contribution to the ongoing project within the legal
academy of “describing our common history, how we came not to know it, and its significance for the study
and practice of law.” K-Sue Park, This Land Is Not Our Land, 87 U. CHI. L. REV. 1977, 1983 (2020).
6
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historiography. Just as there has been a recent effort to reconstitute a shared
knowledge of the Tulsa Race Massacre, there has also been an ongoing effort
to educate lawyers who are familiar with the interactions between racial
identity and property law. I briefly review the existing scholarship and
teaching materials on race and property that have formed part of my own
journey from student to lawyer to teacher in the property law classroom and
that undergird my efforts to rethink my pedagogy in response to the
challenge raised by this Symposium.
THE MASSACRE
Historian and property law professor Alfred Brophy has been
researching and writing about the Tulsa Race Massacre since he worked with
the Tulsa Race Riot Commission on the question of reparations starting in
1997.7 He reminds us that the Massacre was a “complex” event that merits
much more discussion than I offer in this Essay.8 I rely on Brophy’s
scholarship, as well as the work of Ellsworth and others, to provide a brief
summary of the Massacre that could serve as the background for a discussion
of the law of trespass.9
In 1921, the Greenwood District of Tulsa, Oklahoma was home to over
10,000 Black Americans, most of whom had moved there in recent decades
as Tulsa rapidly changed from a sleepy small town to a prosperous oil-boom
city.10 In addition to its residents, Greenwood boasted one of the most
flourishing Black business districts in the United States, sometimes referred
to as the “Black Wall Street,” with hotels, speakeasies, stores, an automobile
repair business, a theater, and pharmacies.11 It had a newspaper, a hospital,
and Black lawyers’ and doctors’ offices.12 It included the city’s all-Black
high school.13 It had everything that a bustling community, whose residents

7

BROPHY, supra note 1, at xiii, 153.
Alfred L. Brophy, Integrating Spaces: New Perspectives on Race in the Property Curriculum, 55
J. LEGAL EDUC. 319, 333 (2005).
9
See id.; BROPHY, supra note 1; ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1; ELLSWORTH,
DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2; see also Alfred L. Brophy, The Tulsa Race Riot of 1921 in
the Oklahoma Supreme Court, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 67 (2001); Alfred L. Brophy, Norms, Law, and
Reparations: The Case of the Ku Klux Klan in 1920s Oklahoma, 20 HARV. BLACKLETTER L.J. 17 (2004);
Alfred L. Brophy, When More Than Property Is Lost: The Dignity Losses and Restoration of the Tulsa
Riot of 1921, 41 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 824 (2016) [hereinafter Brophy, More Than Property]; Scott
Ellsworth, The Tulsa Race Riot, in TULSA RACE RIOT, supra note 1, at 37; KARLOS K. HILL, THE 1921
TULSA RACE MASSACRE: A PHOTOGRAPHIC HISTORY (2021).
10
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 8–14.
11
KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 5 (tracing the nickname back to Booker T. Washington in 1913).
12
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 15–16.
13
KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 5.
8
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were unable to buy homes in white-only neighborhoods, could want for
necessities and amusements.14
On the evening of May 31, a rumor spread that a young Black bootblack,
Dick Rowland, who worked in Tulsa’s white downtown, had attacked a
seventeen-year-old white elevator operator named Sarah Page the day before.15
The rumor was fueled by an inflammatory news report in the afternoon edition
of the Tulsa Tribune.16 While the truth of their encounter will never be
known—in some accounts, Rowland tripped when entering the elevator and
grabbed Page’s arm to catch himself—what is clear is that the white-owned
newspaper insinuated that Rowland had attempted to rape Page, and it possibly
published an editorial calling for a lynching.17 Rowland was arrested and jailed
in the top story of the courthouse.18 White men milled around the courthouse
that night, while Black men from Greenwood, some dressed in their World
War I uniforms, took up arms and went to the courthouse, volunteering their
services to the white sheriff to help him protect Rowland from a mob killing.19
The sheriff sent them away, and, as they were leaving, shots were fired,
resulting in the death of both Black and white men in the crowd.20 Greatly
outnumbered, the Black men fled in cars back to Greenwood.21 That night,
there were more firefights in the streets of Greenwood, as white men looted
shops for weapons and were deputized by the sheriff and given guns.22 The
residents of Greenwood spent a nervous night.23
In the early morning of June 1, a siren sounded, and an invasion began.24
Airplanes flew low over the district, with white men firing weapons from
the air at Black people caught outdoors.25 A machine gun positioned on a
hill fired down a main street.26 Unhindered by the Tulsa police or the local
National Guard, which had arrived during the night, white men piled across
the railroad tracks that bordered the community, shooting anyone who did
14
For descriptions of pre-Massacre Greenwood, see ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra
note 1, at 14–17; ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 14–16. For photographs of
Greenwood before the Massacre, see HILL, supra note 9, at 23–29.
15
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 45–49.
16
Id.; ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 17–19; BROPHY, supra note 1, at 24.
17
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 48; BROPHY, supra note 1, at 24–25;
KREHBIEL, supra note 4, at 30–36 (reviewing the reporting of the Rowland/Page incident, noting that
Rowland is described as a “delivery boy,” and reviewing differing accounts of the editorial missing from the
surviving microfilm copy of the newspaper).
18
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 49.
19
Id.
20
Id. at 50–52.
21
Id.
22
Id. at 54–55.
23
Id.; ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 20–26; BROPHY, supra note 1, at 26–
43; PARRISH, supra note 4, at 9–11 (recounting her own thoughts and actions).
24
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 55.
25
Id. at 63.
26
Id.
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not immediately surrender and pulling people from their homes. As some
Black residents fought back in building-to-building urban warfare, others fled
north out of the city to escape the mob.28 Throughout the day, white Tulsans
systematically removed remaining Black residents at gunpoint and marched
them to internment sites in white Tulsa, including the baseball stadium.29
Then, crowds looted the empty businesses and houses before setting them on
fire.30 At midday, martial law was declared and more National Guard troops
arrived from Oklahoma City, assisting in the process of taking Black residents
into custody and disarming and sending white civilians home, thus bringing a
gradual end to the killing, destruction, and thieving.31
By the time the Massacre ended, “Greenwood [was] gone,” its residents
killed, interned, or fled and its business district and more than 1,000
residences destroyed.32 The number of those killed is uncertain, with
estimates ranging from twenty-nine to over 300.33 Some Black Tulsans spent
a week in internment, needing a white guarantor to be released.34 More than
$2 million ($26 million in today’s currency) in property was destroyed.35
The American Red Cross organized disaster relief in the form of secondhand
clothes, food, and tents, and many residents spent the long, cold winter
camping on their burned-over lots.36 While not all the survivors returned to
Tulsa, most did, and the rebuilding began immediately.37 By the start of
World War II, Greenwood was once again a thriving Black community.38
RACE AND PROPERTY LAW
It is unsurprising that the Massacre is not part of the property law
curriculum, not only because it has been so widely forgotten but also because
multiple efforts by survivors and lawyers have failed to translate any of its
events into a significant legal opinion, the raw material of most first-year
27

Id. at 55, 59.
Id. at 61, 63.
29
Id. at 59.
30
Id. at 57.
31
Id. at 61.
32
ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 37–38; ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A
PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 7.
33
ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 123–24 (reviewing lack of information
about the dead and the source of estimates).
34
Id. at 38.
35
HILL, supra note 9, at 6.
36
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 79–82, 89–94 (noting that aid was
also provided by other local and national groups, including the NAACP).
37
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 88–93. For photographs, see HILL, supra note 9, at 202–13.
38
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 108–09. For photographs of the
rebuilt neighborhood, see HILL, supra note 9, at 213–20. To learn more about Greenwood, present and
past, see About Us, GREENWOOD CULTURAL CTR., https://www.greenwoodculturalcenter.org/about-us
(last visited Feb. 13, 2022).
28

2022]

A LESSON IN THE LAW OF TRESPASS

1013

39

classes. There are numerous judicial decisions from throughout U.S. history,
however, which lay bare the connections between race and property forged
and maintained by law. Due to decades of work by legal scholars and
historians considering these opinions, including their historical context and
their present effect, it should be no secret that property and property law in the
U.S. are inextricably bound to the construction of race.40 By “bound to the
construction of race,” I mean that property and property law have contributed
to the ordering of our society and our thinking such that race has seemed like
a set of biologically defined categories that should and do influence the ways
in which Americans treat each other and the distribution of resources among
us, a contribution that is both historical and ongoing. Law—including, but not
limited to, the law of slavery and the laws mandating Jim Crow racial
segregation—has been a part of our society, politics, and culture since the
Founding in ways that have kept racial categories significant, even though
scientific claims to define race have been debunked.41
History illuminates this relationship.42 If we look back, clearly and steadily,
at the history of North America since the European conquest—considering,
with attention to the racial identification of all participants, who owned
property, who was considered property, who took property, who lost property,
who started out with property, and who has ended up with property—we can
only conclude that racial identity is significant to questions of property. A
legal education is not needed to understand this overall picture. A legal
education is, however, useful to understand the workings of law in the
racialized allocation of property and power. The law is the framework for the
uses of more material forms of power, such as the gun and the lash. It
determines which uses of force are permitted and which are punished, as
explored by other participants in the Symposium.43 The law also shapes the
39

For past legal efforts and the resulting opinions, see supra note 1.
See K-Sue Park, Race and Property Law, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF RACE AND LAW IN THE
UNITED STATES (Devon Carbado, Khiara Bridges & Emily Houh eds., Oxford University Press)
(forthcoming) (manuscript at 2–3), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3908102 (tracing the connections across U.S.
history, citing earlier scholarship, and documenting the extent to which property law scholarship has ignored
this legal history). There is, however, as Park also notes, more work to be done. Park, This Land is Not Our
Land, supra note 6, at 1983, 2001–04 (noting that while “[m]any people in and outside the legal academy
already understand that law played a key role in facilitating the conquest of Indigenous lands and the trade
of human beings,” there remain missing histories and failures to find relevant source materials).
41
KHIARA M. BRIDGES, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: A PRIMER 123–28 (2019).
42
In addition to the historical summary in Park, Race and Property Law, supra note 40, at 2–3, see
Joseph William Singer, Legal Theory: Sovereignty and Property, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 42 (1991)
(challenging us to begin our analysis of American property by “asking how the law treats the original
possessors of land in the United States”); Harris, supra note 5, at 1714 (using history to analyze how
whiteness acts as property in ways that shifted over time with changing laws).
43
The history and present-day ramifications of the law of force, with respect to the Tulsa Race
Massacre, were explored in the second panel of the symposium, “Lack of Protection,” featuring Nicholas
Johnson, Robert Cottrol, Norrinda Hayat, and John McMahon; see also Daniel J. Sharfstein, Atrocity,
Entitlement, and Personhood in Property, 98 VA. L. REV. 635, 654–55 (2012) (exploring the “nastiness,
anger, and pain” involved in property conflicts and the historic relationship between atrocities and property).
40
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definition of property and the means by which it is owned and transferred.
Thus, although a legal education may not be necessary to grasp that law is a
part of history, in order to understand property law—one goal of legal
education—it must be taught in the context of history.44 Yet, the historically
grounded link between property and race is generally absent from
legal education.45
I, like so many other lawyers, was educated under what Professor K-Sue
Park recently called the “norm of erasure” in legal education—a norm that
perpetuates the continuing failure to consider “histories of racial violence,”
such as the Massacre, and, through that erasure, fails to address how property
and property law in the United States are inextricably bound to the
construction of race.46 I, therefore, entered the legal profession with little
appreciation of the relationship between property and race, and, in my
ignorance, I returned to the property classroom prepared to inflict similar
ignorance upon my students. Fortunately, I have had the luxury of relying
on members of the legal academy who have made the connections between
race and property law ever more visible during their years of teaching,
scholarship, and advocacy.47 I have the aid of materials that others have
prepared, including a coursebook on property law and race, co-authored by
Brophy, and a property law casebook organized by Joseph Singer that helps
students begin their analysis of American property by “asking how the law
treats the original possessors of land in the United States.”48
I use their work to haltingly and incompletely explore the past and
present racialized dimensions of property law in the classrooms I lead,
taking my own small steps to avoid reproducing the costs of law’s selective
memory in this area.49 I do not always succeed. I make wincingly bad
44

K-Sue Park, The History Wars and Property Law: Conquest and Slavery as Foundational to the
Field, 131 YALE L.J. 1062 passim (2022).
45
Park, This Land is Not Our Land, supra note 6, at 1995–98, 2000–01; Park, The History Wars
and Property Law, supra note 44, at 9.
46
Park, Race and Property Law, supra note 40, at 2; Park, This Land Is Not Our Land, supra note
6, at 1983; see also Kara W. Swanson, Race and Selective Legal Memory: Reflections on Invention of a
Slave, 120 COLUM. L. REV. 1077, 1081–83 (2020) (arguing that there is a color line in the selective
memory of law that excludes African American sites of memory and describing another example of what
was erased from my legal training and practice).
47
Touchstones of my thinking about property and race include Singer, supra note 42, and Harris,
supra note 5.
48
Singer, supra note 42, at 42 (setting a challenge to take “the law of American Indian property . . .
seriously”); ALFRED L. BROPHY, ALBERTO LOPEZ & KALI N. MURRAY, INTEGRATING SPACES:
PROPERTY LAW & RACE (2011); JOSEPH WILLIAM SINGER ET AL., PROPERTY LAW: RULES, POLICIES,
AND PRACTICES (7th ed. 2017). I also depend on Critical Race Theory and Property, in DOROTHY A.
BROWN, CRITICAL RACE THEORY: CASES, MATERIALS, AND PROBLEMS 275 (2d ed. 2007); see also Park,
The History Wars, supra note 44 at 1071–91 (tracing the history of the property casebook to emphasize
the rarity and recency of such teaching aids).
49
Cf. Swanson, supra note 46, at 1111–18 (tracing the costs of law’s selective memory and
considering ways to mitigate them in patent law).
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missteps, and my students teach me about my continued blind spots. This
Symposium has confronted me with yet another blind spot: I knew
next-to-nothing about the Tulsa Race Massacre, and I had not spared one
moment to think about what that event tells me and could tell future lawyers
about property law.
Thanks to the invitation to participate in this Symposium, I have had the
privilege of reading the historiography of the Massacre while also preparing
to teach and teaching property law, thus correcting my ignorance about the
events in Tulsa while also thinking about how best to help future lawyers
learn about property. In doing so, I have noticed that the scholarship and
teaching aids that I have relied upon focus on conquest and slavery as the
twin racialized origins of property law in the United States—with good
reason.50 Conquest references the history of dispossession of the original
inhabitants of North America by European settlers and their descendants.
This history focuses on real property and the peculiarities of “Indian title,”
which Singer has used to great effect to argue that the protection of property
under U.S. law depends on the legally recognized racial identification of its
claimant.51 Slavery references racialized chattel slavery, a system in which
U.S. law enforced the theft of labor (and much more) from Black Americans
who were defined as property. The law of slavery also created a
jurisprudence of race, legally defining race in ways that contributed to
whiteness as a form of property, reproducing and maintaining white
supremacy.52 These careful and important explications provide rich
resources for the property classroom.
Sometimes lost between the theft of land from Native people and the
theft of labor and personhood from Black Americans is the theft of land from
Black Americans. Recent work has linked the history of racial slavery to the
twentieth-century history of racialized zoning, redlining, and urban
renewal—all practices in which property law has inhibited Black Americans
from acquiring real property or from owning real property that has
appreciated significantly, contributing to persistent racial wealth gaps in the
twenty-first century.53 Yet, Black Americans who succeeded in acquiring
50

Harris, supra note 5, at 1715 (describing “racialized conception of property” as “undergirding
both” the “seizure and appropriation of labor” from Black Americans and the “seizure and appropriation
of land” from Native Americans); Park, This Land Is Not Our Land, supra note 6, at 1983 (making the
erasure of histories of conquest and slavery the centerpiece of her analysis); Park, The History Wars,
supra note 44 (analyzing the same); see also BROPHY, LOPEZ & MURRAY, supra note 48, at xii–xv
(beginning with conquest and slavery to understand “race in the making of property law,” and then
considering the “racial regulation of public spaces,” “discrimination and the sale or occupancy of real
property,” as well as numerous contemporary topics).
51
Singer, supra note 42, at 43.
52
Harris, supra note 5, at 1739–41.
53
See, e.g., RICHARD ROTHSTEIN, THE COLOR OF LAW: A FORGOTTEN HISTORY OF HOW OUR
GOVERNMENT SEGREGATED AMERICA vii–x (2017) (recounting history of government involvement in
racial segregation of land occupancy and ownership and related wealth disparities); BROPHY, LOPEZ &
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54

land are often overlooked. The history of the Tulsa Race Massacre offers
an opportunity to add another perspective to the complex historic
relationship of race and property in the United States by focusing our
attention on a place and time in which Black Americans had accumulated
significant wealth in the form of real and personal property.55
It is with this background and with reliance on the expertise of others
that I offer a rethinking of a lesson on trespass.
TRESPASS AND THE MASSACRE
The law defines the intentional intrusion onto the land of another without
permission as a trespass, both a crime and a civil wrong—that is, a tort.56 I,
and many other property professors, teach the concept early in the course as
part of a foundational discussion of what property is and how the law protects
it. Property includes the right to exclude, and trespass is the translation of that
asserted right—“Get off, and stay off!”—into legal language and claims that
can be enforced with the power of the state. As I tell my students, anyone who
has said, “Mine!,” has a working definition of property.57

MURRAY, supra note 48, at 98–113, 121–46, 163–86 (addressing racially restrictive covenants, civil
rights law, and real estate transactions from the perspective of racial segregation of neighborhoods); Park,
Race and Property Law, supra note 40, at 1 (arguing that race played a key role in producing property
values starting with enslavement and colonization and continuing to the present); Audrey G. McFarlane,
The Properties of Instability: Markets, Predation, Racialized Geography, and Property Law, 2011 WIS.
L. REV. 855 passim (examining real property loss in Black communities related to twenty-first century
predatory lending); Audrey G. McFarlane, Race, Space, and Place: The Geography of Economic
Development, 36 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 295 passim (1999) (considering racial effects of urban
development).
54
One conspicuous exception is the attention to gradual loss of Black-owned farmland due to rules
of intestate succession. Thomas W. Mitchell, From Reconstruction to Deconstruction: Undermining
Black Landownership, Political Independence, and Community Through Partition Sales of Tenancies in
Common, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 505 passim (2001); Thomas W. Mitchell, Destabilizing the Normalization
of Rural Black Land Loss: A Critical Role for Legal Empiricism, 2005 WISC. L. REV. 557 passim;
Thomas W. Michell, Reforming Property Law to Address Devastating Land Loss, 66 A LA. L. REV. 1, 32
(2014); see also Angela P. Harris, [Re]Integrating Spaces: The Color of Farming, 2 SAVANNAH L. REV.
157, 160 (2015) (considering American farms as a site of race-making and the “whitening of American
farm ownership”). Also lost in a history that focuses only on whites, Blacks, and Native peoples are
Latinx and Asian American peoples. While beyond the scope of these remarks, the dimensions of race
and property with respect to other racial identifications are explored in the legal literature. See, e.g.,
BROPHY, LOPEZ & MURRAY, supra note 48, at 89–98, 146–53 (considering laws banning land ownership
by noncitizens that were intended to prohibit ownership by Asian immigrants and property ownership in
primarily Latinx colonias on the Texas border).
55
See Chris M. Messer, Thomas E. Shriver & Alison E. Adams, The Destruction of Black Wall
Street: Tulsa’s 1921 Riot and the Eradication of Accumulated Wealth, 77 AM. J. ECON. SOC. 789, 790
(2018) (analyzing the massacre as the eradication of accumulated wealth).
56
SINGER ET AL., supra note 48, at 3; see also BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1–3 (11th ed. 2019)
(defining “trespass”).
57
I’m not the only property professor who uses that explanatory tactic. See, e.g., MICHAEL HELLER
& JAMES SALZMAN, MINE! HOW THE HIDDEN RULES OF OWNERSHIP CONTROL OUR LIVES 1 (2021).
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Trespass, especially when explained through a childish shout of
“Mine!,” reminiscent of playground disputes, is a seemingly trivial wrong
that in no way encompasses the scope of an armed invasion of a community,
involving the most serious crimes, including murder, arson, and theft.58 The
word “massacre” was chosen to encapsulate the Tulsa events to emphasize
the violent taking of human life.59 The search for and excavation of mass
graves continues in Tulsa as an important part of the reckoning with its
past.60 The deaths require us to consider the Massacre alongside the
contemporaneous history of racial lynching, which is also an important
history to remember and reclaim.61 As Brophy has argued, the early
twentieth-century practice of lynching in Oklahoma was a contributing
factor to the Massacre, and the ongoing violence wreaked on Black bodies
throughout the United States by extralegal mobs is part of the way we need
to understand what the law has to do with this story and many others.62
Without diminishing those realities, when I consider the Tulsa Race
Massacre as a property professor, I see trespass underlying the murder,
arson, and theft. The Black community took up arms to defend life, starting
with saving Dick Rowland from a lynch mob, then continued to act in
defense of their community in the most material and spatial sense, seeking
to exclude the unwanted intrusion into their property.
Black men created a line of defense around Greenwood, fighting to
protect businesses, houses, and the lives of their families, strategically
placing themselves inside and around Black-owned buildings, and resisting
the burning of structures on Black-owned land in order to protect all that
such property offered, including rental income, security, and appreciation of
value.63 It was not just “Black Wall Street” that was under attack. In addition
to the assault on the business district that was a source of livelihood for so
58

As I shared in the slides accompanying my oral presentation at this Symposium, I have
inadvertently added to this trivialization in my property classroom by illustrating my slide of the elements
of the doctrine with a picture of Winnie the Pooh and Piglet next to a “Trespassers Will” sign outside
Piglet’s home.
59
HILL, supra note 9, at 5. But see ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 123
(recounting how W.D. Williams rejected the term “massacre” because “[w]e got as many of them as they
did of us”). Note that in ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 3, W.D. Williams
is referred to by his childhood name of Bill.
60
ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 123–24, 235–45, 253–54, 263–68
(describing city-financed excavations in 2020); see also Carma Hassan, A Total of 27 Graves Have Been
Found So Far at 1921 Tulsa Massacre Search Site, CNN, https://www.cnn.com/2021/06/08/us/tulsarace-massacre-coffins-found/index.html (June 8, 2021, 5:01 PM) (detailing continued excavation).
61
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 2–23 (discussing massacre in the context of lynchings in Oklahoma).
62
Id. at 8–23; see also Brophy, More Than Property, supra note 9, at 831 (2016) (using
BERNADETTE ATUAHENE, WE WANT WHAT’S OURS: LEARNING FROM SOUTH AFRICA’S LAND
RESTITUTION PROGRAM (2014), to consider the losses in Greenwood as dignity takings and part of the
response in following decades as the “preservation or restoration of dignity”).
63
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 41–42 (describing defenders taking strategic locations); PARRISH, supra
note 4, at 11 (“[O]ur men were fighting in vain to hold their dear Greenwood”); ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN
A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 55 (describing Black Tulsans in “defensive positions”).
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many who had left behind lives as agricultural laborers to become
entrepreneurs and professionals, white Tulsans invaded and torched Black
residences, both modest and grand.64 Black Tulsans also fought to defend
personal property, including the well-tailored clothes, jewelry, pianos,
furniture, and housewares that represented acquired wealth and status.65
Some of the Black women and men in Tulsa were just one generation
removed from slavery.66 The property they owned, real and personal,
represented a transformation from being the object of property to being the
subject of property. In the words of United States Supreme Court Justice
William O. Douglas, “Enabling a [Black American] to buy and sell real and
personal property is a removal of one of many badges of slavery.”67 Their
property represented independence, self-sufficiency, and a material erasure
of the differences in dwellings, furnishings, and clothing that had long
distinguished the enslaved from their enslavers in the United States.
Greenwood’s Black residents were accumulating and using property just like
white residents of Tulsa. Their property offered a means of claiming not
whiteness as property but, perhaps, citizenship through property in a country
whose laws had long denied both citizenship and property to persons of
African descent.68 Tulsa had been, in the words of Black Tulsan John
Williams, a “promised land” of freedom and opportunity for Black
Americans and that freedom and opportunity were defined in part through
property ownership.69
The Tulsa Race Massacre stands out not just for the number of lives lost,
but also for the systematic and utter destruction of property, building by
building, block by block. In an organized system, deputized white men
disarmed and arrested Black people, herded them into internment camps,
and left their homes to the mercy of white mobs who first looted, then
burned, turning a thriving business and residential district into smoldering
rubble. This was the theft of property, dependent every step of the way on
trespass by the white participants.
64

BROPHY, supra note 1, at 45, 50, 53, 57.
Id. at 57 (citing a white man who went to Greenwood seeking to prevent the burning of his rental
properties, who described looting of “pianos, victrolas, clothing, chairs, musical instruments, clothing of
all kinds”); ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 33–34 (describing looting, including
by “women with shopping bags”).
66
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 2 (describing post-Emancipation migration); ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A
PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 12 (noting that some Black Oklahomans had arrived involuntarily,
enslaved by Cherokees and Creeks); MADIGAN, supra note 4, at 242–43 (retelling a story, reported in
Tulsa World on June 2, 1921, that described a Massacre survivor as formerly enslaved).
67
Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 444 (1968) (Douglas, J., concurring).
68
Harris, supra note 5, at 1714, 1718 (analyzing “whiteness as property” and describing laws
preventing property ownership); Dred Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393, 413 (1857) (denying
citizenship to free and enslaved Black Americans).
69
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 1 (quoting John’s son Bill (W.D.),
who recounted his father’s explanation of why he had migrated to Tulsa from Mississippi).
65
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As I think of the Black residents first defending their property and then,
by the power of the state, being prevented from doing so, I think of Professor
Felix Cohen’s definition of property, published in 1954:
[T]hat is property to which the following label can be attached:
To the world:
Keep off X unless you have my permission, which I may grant
or withhold.
Signed: Private citizen
Endorsed: The state70
My property students and I encounter this definition in Jacque v.
Steenberg Homes, Inc., a case decided in 1997 by the supreme court of my
home state of Wisconsin, in which the court vindicated the private property
rights of an “elderly” white couple retired from farming.71
The Jacques sued for trespass after a mobile home company, over the
Jacques’ strenuous objections, dragged a mobile home across their field in
order to deliver it to a customer’s lakefront lot that was otherwise accessible
only by an unplowed and sharply curved private road.72 Steenberg Homes
did not want to spend the money required to plow seven feet of snow off the
private road or to maneuver the mobile home around a hairpin turn. Instead,
after a discussion with town officials, neighbors, and Mr. Jacque, during
which Jacque reiterated his refusal of access and proved that he owned the
land in question, Steenberg employees plowed a path through the Jacques’
field and moved the home.73
The jury found that the Jacques suffered no economic harm but awarded
punitive damages of $100,000.74 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin affirmed
the award, citing cases back to 1814 for the principle that, “in certain cases
70
Felix S. Cohen, Dialogue on Private Property: The Pragmatic Meaning of Private Property, 9
RUTGERS L. REV. 357, 374 (1954). Cohen was a leading legal realist and an expert on American Indian
law who taught legal philosophy, worked in the New Deal federal government, and engaged in the private
practice of law. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAW (1941); DALIA
TSUK MITCHELL, ARCHITECT OF JUSTICE: FELIX S. COHEN AND THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN LEGAL
PLURALISM 4–5 (2007); ALICE BECK KEHOE, A PASSION FOR THE TRUE AND JUST: FELIX AND LUCY
KRAMER COHEN AND THE INDIAN NEW DEAL (2014).
71
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 156 (Wis. 1997). The Jacques’ racial
identification is confirmed by the records of the 1940 Census and Harvey Jacque’s draft registration card.
SIXTEENTH CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, POPULATION SCHEDULE, State of Wisconsin, County
of Ozaukee, S.D. No. 6, E.D. No. 45-17, Sheet No. 3B (enumerating Harvey, under Jacque); SIXTEENTH
CENSUS OF THE UNITED STATES: 1940, POPULATION SCHEDULE, State of Wisconsin, County of Ozaukee,
E.D. No. 45-5, Sheet No. 15A (enumerating Lois, under birthname Barnes) (each identified “W” under
“color or race”); Draft Registration Card, Ser. No. 212, June 30, 1942 (identifying Harvey Jacque as
“White Race”).
72
Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 156–57.
73
Id. at 157.
74
Id. at 158.
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of trespass, the actual harm is not in the damage done to the land, which may
be minimal, but in the loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from
his or her property.”75 My students uniformly and easily agree that the right
to exclude others is an important aspect of owning property, and they agree
with the court’s conclusion that property rights become “hollow if the legal
system provides insufficient means to protect” them.76 They, like the
justices, are offended by the facts indicating that the mobile home company
deliberately disregarded the Jacques’ wishes in order to maximize its profit
when other alternatives were available. A witness testified that Steenberg
Homes’ assistant manager had ordered his employees to proceed just out of
sight of the Jacques’ house; when he was told that the mobile home had been
moved across the field, he reacted by “giggling and laughing.”77
The Court quoted Cohen’s definition of property in support of its
holding that the Jacques suffered “actual harm,” even though their frozen
field was undamaged by the passage of the mobile home. Steenberg Homes
“would not take ‘no’ for an answer” when the Jacques told them they were
withholding permission to be on their land.78 It refused to respect the
metaphorical label attached to the Jacques’ farm, telling the world to keep
off. The justices concluded that the Jacques’ rights had “no practical
meaning” without an ability to obtain a state-enforced damages award when
their directive, “No, you cannot cross our land,” was ignored.79 Their ability
to obtain significant damages for trespass was the endorsement by the state
of that invisible label, an essential part of the legal definition of property.
In upholding the punitive damages award of $100,000, the court also
referenced “society’s interest in protecting private property.”80 Appropriate
punishment of intentional trespassers, the court declared, preserves “the
integrity of the legal system.”81 Reviewing the facts, the court found that
Steenberg Homes showed “an indifference and a reckless disregard for the
law, and for the rights of others.”82 Punitive damages were appropriate to
“remov[e] the profit from illegal activity,” to deter Steenberg Homes from
repeating its outlaw approach to mobile home delivery, and to deter others
from refusing to take no for an answer.83 “When landowners have
confidence in the legal system, they are less likely to resort to ‘self-help’

75
Id. at 159 (citing McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424 (1854) and Merest v. Harvey (1814) 128 Eng.
Rep. 761 (CP)).
76
Id. at 160.
77
Id. at 157.
78
Jacque v. Steenburg Homes, Inc., 548 N.W.2d 80, 81 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
79
Jacque, 563 N.W.2d at 160.
80
Id. at 160, 165–66.
81
Id. at 160.
82
Id. at 164.
83
Id. at 165.
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remedies.” The conclusion of the court and my students is that enforcement
of trespass law is needed to force would-be wrongdoers to refrain from
misconduct and to save property owners from the understandable resort to
self-help through force.
What happens if we take this opinion, so useful for explaining the law
of trespass and so clear in its promise of state defense of private property,
and add knowledge of the Tulsa Race Massacre? What was the value of the
“loss of the individual’s right to exclude others from his or her property”
experienced by every property owner and tenant in Greenwood?
White Tulsans levelled thirty-five city blocks, rendering over 1,000
families homeless and destroying every business.85 The property losses
included the Dreamland Theatre, operated by the Williams family in a
building that they built and owned.86 In a revised lesson, I imagine that
sharing a photograph or two of the Massacre’s aftermath would be worth
more than a thousand professorial words when considering these questions
about trespass and the definition of property.87 For example, consider the
photograph of the burned Dreamland Theatre, with the marquee sign drooping
against a hollow shell.88 The income from this property supplemented the
confectionary business that Loula Williams operated out of another building
that she and her husband, John, also built and owned—a building that
additionally housed their apartment and office space for Black
professionals.89 In yet a third building, John operated his garage. The
Williamses were the first residents of Greenwood to own an automobile, and
white Tulsans brought their cars to John’s garage, as he was one of the few
in the city with expertise in the new machines.90 The Williams family lost
their home, rental income, and three businesses in the Massacre, after the
efforts of John, his son, and other men to defend their properties with
firearms failed in the face of overwhelming force, and the Williamses fled
for their lives in a hail of bullets.91
If the Jacques were entitled to $100,000 in 1997 for having to live with
the knowledge that a mobile home was dragged across their field—an
outrage they did not witness and which left no trace on their land—what is
the appropriate compensation for the “actual harm” suffered by the Black
84

Id. at 160.
ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 75–77.
86
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 2–3.
87
As part of its on-line exhibit on the Massacre, The Tulsa Historical Society and Museum has
made numerous photos available for public viewing. Photos, TULSA HIST. SOC’Y & MUSEUM,
https://www.tulsahistory.org/exhibit/1921-tulsa-race-massacre/photos/ (last visited June 8, 2022); see
also HILL, supra note 9 (publishing photos with accompanying context).
88
See, e.g., BROPHY, supra note 1, at cover; HILL, supra note 9, at 74 fig.1.30.
89
ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 2–3.
90
Id. at 1–2.
91
Id. at 5–6; see also ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 79–82 (describing
details as told to Ellsworth by survivor W.D. Williams in 1975).
85
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residents of Tulsa, who watched armed men enter their homes, light their
drapes on fire, and drag their possessions into the street, then were marched
away with their hands in the air, fearing being shot at every moment?92 What
is the appropriate compensation when the noneconomic harm of having their
property invaded was compounded by the loss of every possession except
the clothing on their backs?
If I shared this history with my students, and then detailed the grand jury
investigation that found that the Black community was responsible for its
own destruction, the failure of the legal system to convict any white
perpetrator, the refusal of white Tulsa to aid its Black neighbors in the
aftermath, and the dismissal of each lawsuit seeking recovery for losses,
what might we conclude about “the integrity of the legal system?”93
The Wisconsin court noted that “one can easily imagine a frustrated
landowner taking the law into his or her own hands when faced with a brazen
trespasser . . . who refuses to heed no trespass warnings.”94 No court,
policeman, or city official considered the Black Greenwood residents
“frustrated landowners” facing “brazen trespassers.” They were, rather,
treated as if they had no right to property; that is, they were treated as if they
had no power to attach a label telling the world to keep off anything that
their earnings had bought. As Brophy has noted, on the morning of June 1,
the white men in Tulsa who were authorized to use force—the police and
National Guard—lined up facing Greenwood, with their backs to white
Tulsa.95 The power of the state was defending white-owned property, even
as white Tulsans trespassed by invading Black-owned property.
White Tulsans in 1921 acted as if “the black man has no rights which
the white man was bound to respect,” their actions echoing the Dred Scott
v. Sandford decision of 1857, formally overturned by the Reconstruction
Amendments.96 Rather than property-owning citizens, Black Tulsans were
treated like a key character in another foundational property law case I
discuss with my students: the fox in Pierson v. Post, whose ownership
92

The detail about the drapes is from the account of survivor George Monroe, five years old and
hiding under a bed with his sister when armed white men led their mother away at gunpoint and set their
home on fire. ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 113–14. In addition to the firsthand accounts of Black Tulsans rousted from their homes and interned, see ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND
BREAKING, supra note 1, at 27–38; ELLSWORTH, DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 57-63;
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 44–59, there are photographs of armed whites marching Black men with their
hands in the air to internment sites, as well as guarding Black women and children who were also taken
into custody, sometimes in family groups and sometimes separated. HILL, supra note 9, at 92–130.
93
ELLSWORTH, THE GROUND BREAKING, supra note 1, at 41 (noting that the grand jury concluded
that the riot was “the direct result” of the actions of “colored men” and indicted only Black Tulsans);
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 74–76 (reviewing the lack of legal accountability). But see Brown, supra note
1 (reporting on a pending lawsuit that survived a motion to dismiss).
94
Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, Inc., 563 N.W.2d 154, 209 (Wis. 1997).
95
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 52–53.
96
Scott v. Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 407 (1857).
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sparked the lawsuit. One of the judges in Pierson described the hunted fox,
a wild animal without the ability to own property or to protest its killing in
a court of law, as a “pirate” outside “the law of nations,” whom public policy
urged should be hunted out of town.98 White Tulsans proudly circulated
postcard images of the burned Greenwood district with the caption:
“RUNING [sic] THE NEGRO OUT OF TULSA.”99 Like foxes, Black
Tulsans had been hunted from their homes, some captured, and others killed.
On June 1, 1921, Black Tulsans had no state endorsement of their
decisions to “grant or withhold” access to their property. In the Massacre,
the ability to own property—previously withheld from Black Americans,
free and enslaved, by force of law and so recently granted by the Civil Rights
Act of 1866—was withdrawn as city and state officials facilitated the
burning and looting.100 In Tulsa, the trespasser, rather than the “frustrated
landowner,” was given the endorsement of the state, while the Williamses
and their neighbors became the outlaw “pirates,” paraded through town with
their hands in the air to the jeers of white Tulsans.101
As Brophy has argued, the Massacre was part of an ongoing dynamic in
which Black Tulsans sought in vain for the “rule of law,” which they
believed would offer them equal treatment.102 Even the basic principle of
trespass failed to withstand anti-Black racism. White Tulsans “pursued a
different law [that allowed] control through terror.”103 Instead of respecting
the metaphorical labels Black Tulsans thought the law had attached to their
property, white Tulsans labeled Black Tulsans. After the Massacre, Black
Tulsans could only be released from internment upon obtaining a green
identification card or a beige “WORKMAN” tag, each naming the white
person who had certified that the wearer would “be kept inside or at their
place of work.”104 Black Tulsans were returned to being the objects of
property, bearing another’s name.

97

Pierson v. Post, 3 Cai. 175, 175 (1805).
Id. at 177, 180 (Livingston, J., dissenting).
99
HILL, supra note 9, at 59 fig.1.17; see also BROPHY, supra note 1, at 8, 66 (describing early
references by white Oklahomans to “negro drives” as violent means of removing Black residents and
reproducing photo with this handwritten caption).
100
42 U.S.C. § 1982 (“All citizens of the United States shall have the same right, in every State and
Territory, as is enjoyed by white citizens thereof to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real
and personal property.”).
101
Parrish, supra note 4, at 42–43 (recording testimony of A.J. Newman that he was “called all
kinds of names”); see also Hill, supra note 9, at 112–13 (interpreting photos to show that “white
onlookers seem[ed] to enjoy the public spectacle of Black Tulsans being herded through the streets”).
102
BROPHY, supra note 1, at 2.
103
Id. at 6; see also id. at 2 (describing different Black and white views of law in Oklahoma before
the Massacre).
104
See Hill, supra note 9, at 133–40 figs.2.33–2.37 (showing various versions of identification cards
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CONCLUSION
Thirty years ago, Joseph Singer demonstrated how it can be shocking
and effective to show future lawyers that United States Supreme Court cases
on American Indian law lead inexorably to the conclusion that:
[I]f we want to help a client determine the extent of its property
rights, the first thing we need to know is whether the client is
an American Indian nation or, say, a business corporation. The
law provides a certain level of protection for the interests of
General Motors and quite a different level of protection for the
interests of the Yakima Nation. Imagine having to explain this
to a client, and being asked why.105
The Tulsa Race Massacre offers an opportunity to make a similar
comparison between the white Wisconsin farmers, Harvey and Lois Jacque,
and Black Tulsans, such as the Williamses. The Massacre returns us to a
moment in which Black Tulsans acquired both real and personal property,
were threatened by trespassers bent on theft and destruction, attempted
self-help, and found both self-help and the legal system insufficient to
protect their assertion of property ownership. Considering the law of trespass
in this historic context “appears to reverse the abstract principles” taught as
bedrock property law.106
Applying the clear terms of Jacque can lead only to the conclusion that
the property rights of Greenwood residents were “hollow.” During the
Massacre, they were hollow as the state defended white property and
facilitated the destruction of Black-owned property. After the Massacre, they
were hollow as claims for compensation by Greenwood residents were
denied by the City and the courts.107 In 1997, the same year that the
Wisconsin Supreme Court approved $100,000 in damages to repair the
“actual harm” to the Jacques, the Tulsa Race Riot Commission began its
work and, eventually, in 2001, it recommended reparations to Massacre
survivors.108 The Oklahoma legislature refused, however, and instead passed
a bill that gave each a “gold-plated medallion.”109
The Tulsa Race Massacre offers a lesson that the ownership of real
property in the United States is not only racialized through the legal
105

Singer, supra note 42, at 44.
See Park, The History Wars, supra note 44, at 58–59 (discussing how historical context similarly
reverses the property law doctrines of discovery, labor theory, and possession).
107
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Greenwood residents could find money and materials. BROPHY, supra note 1, at 93–95; ELLSWORTH,
DEATH IN A PROMISED LAND, supra note 2, at 84–88.
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ratification of conquest, with racially discriminatory treatment of possessors
that systematically dispossessed Native peoples, but also through extralegal
means that took property from United States citizens. The survivors of the
Massacre had deeds and bills of sale. They had paid dollars for their
possessions. In sum, they made property claims through the same activities
as white Tulsans. Yet, non-owners were allowed to trespass at will and
property owners were denied the state’s endorsement of their rights—that is,
when the trespassers were white and the property owners were Black.
If I offer my students the classic definition of trespass with knowledge
of the Massacre, we are forced to consider what asterisks are missing from
the definition: “unprivileged, intentional intrusion onto property owned by
another.” Is trespass in the United States, in many times and places,
including Tulsa, Oklahoma on May 31 and June 1, 1921, more accurately
defined as the unprivileged, intentional intrusion onto property owned by a
white person? Or does whiteness confer the “privilege” that allows
intentional intrusion onto property owned by Black people?110 This revised
lesson requires us to wrestle with how, why, and when principles of law are
seemingly reversed in ways that link what property is to how property
ownership is sustained.
The Tulsa Race Massacre also offers a lesson on the limits of property
law by focusing our attention on how much depends on the state
endorsement Cohen identified. In Tulsa, that endorsement depended on the
action of numerous individuals—sheriffs, police, National Guardsmen,
grand jury members, and the mayor—choosing whose property claims to
support, deciding what sort of self-help was tolerable, and determining who
was allowed to use force.
These lessons are an answer to my starting question of what we gain if
property law were taught with full knowledge of the Tulsa Race Massacre.
We would gain lawyers with an added understanding of the complex historic
relationship of race and property in the United States. Even the most
seemingly straightforward rule shifts with the racial identification of the
actors. Comparing the experiences of the Jacques and the Williamses
prepares future lawyers to be attentive to the ways in which the rules that
they learn only have meaning when people (including, but not limited to,
those in the legal system) choose to apply them. It challenges those of us
who nod our heads approvingly at the reasoning in Jacque v. Steenberg
Homes, Inc. to consider the frustrations and claims of others whose property
rights are ignored with all the sympathy that a Wisconsin jury and supreme
court showed the Jacques, and to examine the reasons why that sympathy
has often been absent.
110
Here, I use “privilege” in the legal sense to mean a legally cognizable reason that makes an
intentional intrusion onto property owned by another not a trespass. Traditionally, students are taught
that privilege includes some sort of consent by the owner, necessity, or public policy. SINGER ET AL.,
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These, of course, are not the only lessons the Tulsa Race Massacre offers
property students. Brophy reminds us that the Massacre is worth studying as
an example of one of many riots caused, in part, by racial segregation of
housing. The same Jim Crow laws that helped the Greenwood business
district prosper by providing a captive consumer base for Black businesses
also provided a convenient locus for white anger at the growing wealth of
the Black community by concentrating Black wealth in one neighborhood.111
As we discuss the forgetting, remembering, and reevaluation of the events
in Tulsa, we also need to recognize that it is not the only such massacre to
be deliberately forgotten.112 Each event like the Tulsa Race Massacre offers
lessons to future lawyers, as well as opportunities for lawyers with an
understanding of race and property law in United States history to participate
in ongoing conversations about redress and reparations.
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